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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

,-~,L::o
IN THE MATTER tF TllE 1 i6A
ESTATE AND GUARDIAN----------·SHIP OF JOAN OELERICH_, . v~·-'· L.i·.L
Incompetent.
·· . ~->-· '. "'' .; ... HELEN D. OELERICH,
Case No.
Petitioner and Appellant, ) 10005
vs.

JOAN OELERICH,

Respondent.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appeal From a Judgment of the Third District Court
For Salt Lake County
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge

George M. McMillan
1020 Kearns Bldg.
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
Attorney for Petitioner and
Appellant
James B. Lee
1006 Kearns Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Respondent
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STAT~ OF UTAH
IN THE ~LATTER OF TilE
EST1\TE AND Gl~~ARDLAN
SHIP OF JO..:\X OELERICH,
Incompetent.

HELEN D. OELERICH,
Petitioner and Appellant,

Case No.
10005

vs.

JOAN OELERICH,

Respondent.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
This brief is filed after argtunent, pursuant to the
agreement of counsel and the Order of Court made ~lay
12, 1964. It is directed primarily to the arguments made
in the respondent's brief to the effect that the order
of the trial court in dismissing the action was appropriate because of an alleged agreement by counsel to a
dismissal. Point I will demonstrate that there is no
basis for dismissal on this ground. Point II will show
that reversal of the lower court's order is appropriate
because the ruling would be prejudicial to the appellant
in the event another petition was filed.
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POINT I
IF THE LOWER COURT'S DISMISSAL
OF THE PETITION WAS ON THE GROUND
THAT IT WAS PURSUANT TO AN OPEN
COURT STIPULATION OF THE ATTORNEYS FOR THE PARTIES, THE ORDER
WAS ERRONEOUS.
A. .An agreement to dismiss is not sustained by the
record. In each of the many instances where the respondent contends that the petitioner's counsel agreed
in open court that the petition was to be dismissed upon
the signing of the Trust Agreement, the reference is
to pages 139 and 140 of the record. The record indicates,
in these places, that Judge Hanson stated in substance
at a hearing held August 26, 1963, that it was his recollection that at a hearing held more than a year earlier,
counsel for the parties had stated that if a Trust Agreement was signed, the petition would be dismissed. N eitheir Mr. Lee, who presently represents the respondent,
nor Merlin 0. Baker, who was representing the petitioner at the time of the hearing (August 26, 1963)
represented the parties at the earlier date. The earlier
hearing preceded the execution of the Trust Agreement. It was dated May 8, 1962. The earlier hearing
would have been, therefore, at least fifteen months prior
to the time when Judge Hanson was remembering it.
Judge Hanson stated that no record was made of the
prior hearing (R. 139, 140). There was no minute
entry. Mr. Baker stated to Judge Hanson that peti4
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tioner had never entered into such an arrangetnent and
did not have any such arrangement (R. 140). The
petitioner's position was reiterated in a brief filed with
.Judge Hanson on September 5, 1963 ( R. 113, 118)
in which it was again made clear that the petitioner
denied that there was such representation 1nade to the
trial judge.
The reason given for Judge Hanson amounts to
his testifying, as a witness who allegedly heard a conversation, that the conversation occurred, and then as
a judge, deciding that his own testimony was true.
Despite the fact the conversation was denied by cotmsel for petitioner, she was given no opportunity to be
heard on the determination of the critical fact.
It is no disparagement of a trial judge to urge
that his recollection of an occurrence in open court
might be erroneous. Every lawyer knows that the reason
for court reporters is to obtain as great a certainty as
possible as to the statements of witnesses, the Court,
and counsel in a judicial proceeding. The Rules provide that there should be a hearing to determine the
appropriate record when the trial or other proceeding
is not stenographically recorded. It is submitted that
when a trial judge bases an order upon a statement
made to him fifteen months earlier, during argument
on a motion, and the judge is notified that one of the
litigants disputes his recollection of the events, that at
least an opportunity should be afforded to determine
the accuracy of the judge's recollection. It is certainly
5
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understandable that any judge having matters before
him day after day for fifteen or sixteen months could
have a lapse of memory or an inaccurate recollection
of the precise statements made by counsel.
The point is that in the instant case, Judge Hanson
afforded no opportunity for hearing on the factual
question as to whether the petitioner's first attorneys
made the kind of statements which were imputed to
them. He assumed the existence of a disputed fact without any support in the record.

B. If there was a stipulation~ it failed to comply
with the provisions of Section 78-51-32, U.C.A. 1953
as amended. The statute says:
"An attorney and counsel has authority ...
( 2) to bind his client in any of the steps or
action of a proceeding by his agreement filed
with the clerk or entered upon the minutes of
the court and not otherwise.n (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondent admits that this provision of the statute
was not satisfied. It is interesting that there is in the
file a typed form of agreement to the effect that the
petition would be dismissed. This piece of paper, however, dated the"---- day of May, 1963," and prepared for
signature of Mr. Lee and Mr. Baker, is not signed by
anyone and there is no indication as to the person who
prepared it or the purpose that it was to serve (R. 102,
103}. Certainly there is no minute entry or written
agreement signed by anybody which complies with the
provisions of the statute.
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In construing the statute, the Court said, in
lUcWhirter l'. Donaldson et al (1909) 36 Ut. 293, 104

P. 737:
"The stipulation in question was neither filed
with the clerk nor otherwise made a matter of
record; therefore appellant cannot claim anything for the stipulation because, under the foregoing proYisions of the statute, neither he nor
his counsel had any legal right to rely upon it."
The Utah court cited the California case of Borkheim
v. N.B. & M. Ins. Co.~ 38 Cal. 623, and quoted with
approval the following language:
"It declares such agreements null and void
unless they are in writing and filed with the clerk
or have been entered in the minutes of the court.
Of such agreement, therefore, there can be no
specific performance. To allow the court to enforce them, as was done in this case, against the
will or without the consent of the parties, is to
allow the court to work the precise mischief
which the statute was designed to prevent. Instead of being nullified in that way, the statute
ought to be strictly.adhered to, for it is the dictation of wisdom. Without it the court would be
frequently annoyed by disputes between counsel
concerning their agreements, and thus forced to
try innumerable side issues more perplexing than
the case itself, attended, also, with delay to its
business, and the detriment to the public service."
As in the Borkheim case, failure to follow the
statute results in the very mischief which it was designed
to prevent. Unless it is followed, the trial courts will
inevitably be led to trying side issues which might be

7
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more perplexing than the case in chief. Particularly
where the court below was advised that counsel disputed
the court's recollection of the alleged stipulation, failure
to apply the provisions of the statute was clearly erroneous. Judge Hanson indicated that he believed that
the agreement would have been binding under the
statute (R. 140). It is submitted that this is clearly an
erroneous assumption, particularly under the circwnstances of this case. The general rule is that an attorney
does not have implied authority to have an action discontinued or dismissed where such a continuance or
dismissal may operate as a bar to the institution of
a new action. See annotation A. uthority of A. ttorney

to Dismiss or Otherwise Terminate Action, 56 ALR
( 2d) 1290, particularly at pages 1291, 1292. Respondent cites Gagnon Co. v. Nevada Desert Inn, 45 Cal (2d)
448, 289 P (2d) 466. (Respondent's brief, 7-8). But
even in that case, the Court stated that the apparent
conflict in the cases could "be reconciled on the theory
that there is a rebuttal presumption that he had such
authority." Even if Judge Hanson was to indulge the
presumption that counsel was authorized to dismiss
the proceeding, he was put on notice that the client
had never entered into any such agreement and that
if any such statements were made by counsel, they were
not authorized (R. 140). An opportunity should have
been afforded to the petitioner to present evidence to
rebut the presumption which Judge Hanson thought
existed. This is particularly true where the alleged
stipulation clearly fails to comply with the statutory
requirement.
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C. 'l'he c.:ondul't of the parties does not indicate
that any stipulation for dismissal existed. The Trust
..Agreement with the Chicago bank was executed )lay
8, 1962 (R. 76). Mr. Lee was retained as counsel for
the respondent in September, 1962 (R. 139). For at
least three or f9lll mo~ths immediately prior _to the
filing of the motion to di~miss. (July 10, l963, lt~ 73, !1())
Mr. Lee and .1\I_r. llaker ':"ere engag,eq in settl~ment
negotiations involving a possibility of dismissing the
action if the respondent would submit to a ment.al examination ( R~ 141) ~ Certainly Mr. Lee would have
been advised by prior counsel of a stipulation to di'smiss
if one would ha v·e been thought to be in existence. No
purpose would have been served by his continuing to
negotiate for three or four months after he made an
appearance in the case if he believed that the petitioner was o'Qligated to dismiss it under a. prior agreement.
Moreover~

the motion· filed · by· Mr. _Le.e was not
upon the ground that the petitioner. was bound hy a
prior stipulation; it was, instead, on the ground that
petitioner had not been diligent ~n proceeding and that
the Trust Agreement ·protects the· property of··the respondent from artful or designing persons (R. 74, 75).
The inadequacy of these grounds- was demonstrated· in
appellant's main brief. ·If counsel had believed that
there was an agreement along the lines :which Judge
Hanson referred, to in his testimony, it is reasonable
to ·believe that the motion would have been filed on that
ground.
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These circumstances belie the existence of an understanding between the parties.

POINT II.
THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT
SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT IS
A FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER.
At the oral argument on May 12, the question
was raised as to whether Judge Hanson's ruling was
an appropriate subject for an appeal because petitioner may, presumably, at any time, file a new petition
asserting incompetence.
Respondent has referred to cases concerning the
authority of attorneys where a dismissal was entered
without prejudice (Respondent's brief, pp. 6-13). It
is clear, however, that these cases are not applicable to
the present case because by virtue of Rule 41 (b) of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, the instant case was dismissed with prejudice.
It is clear, as the respondent points out in her brief,
that the Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable in
determining whether or not the instant case is appealable. While the Rules do not apply to uncontested
guardianship proceedings, Rule 41 (b) makes them
applicable upon joinder of issue. Neither the record
nor the order itself supports respondent's contention
that the dismissal was under Rule 41 (a). Plaintiff's
own brief argues that it is a dismissal under Rule 41 (b),
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nt least with respect to that part of the order that disInissed for failure to prosecute ( H.espendent's brief,
pp. ~i-i7). Eve11 if one concedes the highly questionable
existence of an agreen1ent to stipulate to dismissal, it
is inconceivable that the attorneys for the alleged incompetent would have entered into a stipulation that
gave them only the assurance of a dismissal without
prejudice which would permit the petitioner to at any
time commence another proceeding.
It is abundantly clear that the Court's order was
made under· Rule 41 (b) -with respect to both grounds.
It is apparently based on failure to prosecute and 'that
the Trust Agreement negated a right to relief.
Respondent's own argument (Respondent's. brief,
pp. 22-27): supports the view that, in part at least, the
order was made .under Rule 41 (b) ; Respondent urges
that the order was proper because it was for failure to
prosecute diligently. The Rule provides that any dis~
missal under this subsection 41 (b) or any other dismissal other than. one granted under· 41 (a). operates
as an adjudication on the merits unless the court otherwise specifies. Respondent concedes, and the court's
order affirms that the court did not otherwise specify
(Respondent's brief, p. 7). This conceded dismissal
under Rule 41 (b) operated as an adjudication on the
merits or a dismissal with prejtidice, and as such, it became an appealable final order under Sec. 78-2-2,
U.C.A. 1953, which provides for appellate review of all
:final orders and decrees in guardianship proceedings.
11
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A petitioner who is denied appointment as a guardian of an alleged incompetent by virtue of a court order
is entitled to appeal such an order. People v. O~Con
nell (1941) 38 N.E. (2d) 40, 378 Ill. 346.
While there does not appear to be any case law on
the question as to whether a petitioner who has had a
petition dismissed on the merits can immediately file
another petition without showing a change in circumstances, it seems highly questionable that such rule
would prevail. To allow indiscriminate filing of petitions of guardianship for alleged incompetency would
seem to open the door to the very kind of harrassment
that the respondent seems to fear. It is suggested that,
upon filing of a second petition, respondent would argue
that a change in circumstances or mental condition
should be shown or alleged. Appeal is the proper remedy
for a petitioner who has been denied a petition of guardianship by a dismissal which was necessarily with
prejudice.
Even though there was no hearing on the merits
of the petition, the errors inherent in failure to allow
presentation of the issues on the merit are manifestly
prejudicial.

CONCLUSION
The order of the District Court was erroneous
upon each of the grounds discussed in appellant's opening brief, and upon the further ground that no open
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.~-

~

court s'tlipu~t&:d it. The ruling was prejudicial to petitioner and appealable under the rules. This court should
reverse the order and reinstate the petition.
Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE M.

Mc~IILLAN

1020 Kearns Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Petitioner
May 26, 1964
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